On 30 March 2011, Burma/Myanmar’s ruling junta, the State
Peace and Development Council, dissolved itself and handed over power to an
elected, quasi-civilian government. Than Shwe retired, relinquishing his head
of state and commandeering- chief roles, and even his rank – stating that from
now on he would be referred to as “U Than Shwe” not “Senior General”.
Most of the international discussion has focused on
whether these changes represent the beginnings of a process of ‘genuine’
democratic transition, or whether this was merely “old wine in a new bottle”.
Much of the analysis has focused on the extent to which
Than Shwe will continue to call the shots on major decisions going forward.
There has been less analysis on what is perhaps the most important challenge
facing the country: addressing ethnic minority grievances and resolving the
multiple, decades-long conflicts. This paper takes an initial look at what the
prospects are in this area, two months after the new government took office. Of
course, any analysis at this early stage can only be tentative, but there have
already been a number of sufficiently important developments – the first
sessions of the legislatures, the appointment of standing committees, and the
appointment of local governments – to make such an analysis worthwhile.
Two key areas will be assessed: firstly, the composition
and functioning of the new governance structures, particularly the
decentralized legislative and executive institutions, and the impact that these
could have on the governance of ethnic minority areas; and secondly, the status
of the ceasefires and ongoing insurgencies, and the prospects for peace.
Positive
Initial Signals
One of the first issues that the new President Thein Sein
spoke about in his inaugural address to the congress was the ethnic nationality
question:
As you know, national brethren remained united in the
struggles to liberate the nation from the rule of the colonialists and regained
independence. But, in the post-independence period, national races involved in
armed conflicts among them[selves for about five decades due to dogmatism,
sectarian strife and racism instead of rebuilding the nation. In
consequence,the people were going through the hell of untold miseries.
He went on to say that “we will give top priority to
national unity”. While it remains to be seen
how this will be translated into concrete policy, it is an important
recognition of the importance – indeed, the primacy – of the ethnic question.
Subsequently, on 23 April the President chaired a meeting of a high-level
committee tasked with overseeing the issue – the Central Committee for Progress
of Border Areas and National Races – saying that his government must “convince
the people from the border areas of the government’s goodwill efforts for peace
and stability and development so that they can come to cooperate with the Union
government and state and region governments with understanding”.
This
is not a new committee: it was formed in 1989, and had until now been chaired
by Than Shwe. But the language has shifted noticeably. Compare Thein Sein’s
comments above with Than Shwe’s comments to the committee in 2007, where there
was no recognition of problems, only talk of success:
National race armed groups began returning to the legal
fold one after another, and they are now carrying out development tasks hand in
hand with the government. Thanks to extensive implementation of development
tasks, there has been mutual understanding and trust between one national race
and another along with stability and peace. … Border areas are enjoying
unprecedented development in all aspects at present.
However, after decades of conflict, ethnic grievances run
deep, and events leading up to the change of government in some cases
exacerbated those grievances – including the failure to register ethnic parties
in some areas, and pressure on ceasefire groups to join the controversial
Border Guard Force scheme without any resolution of the underlying political
issues. Furthermore, brutal counterinsurgency tactics continue to be used by
the military in the ethnic borderlands, meaning that conciliatory language from
central government in the Burmese capital of Nay Pyi Taw will be insufficient
to convince many citizens and communities of “government goodwill”.
Prospects
for Improved Ethnic Governance
Under the 2008 Constitution, which came into force on 31
January 2011, certain legislative and executive powers were decentralized to
the region/state level. Thus, the seven ethnic-minority states (like the seven
Burman-majority regions) now have their own state legislatures and state
governments. These structures are dominated by the government’s Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). All of the speakers of the state
legislatures are from the USDP, as are the chief ministers, who head up the
state executives (with the exception of the Chief Minister for Kayin [Karen]
State, who is a military legislator). The situation is thus very far from the
federal autonomy or self-governance demanded by many ethnic leaders.
Nevertheless,
ethnic political parties will have some limited influence over these
structures, in the following ways:
1. Through their seats in the legislatures.
None of the ethnic nationality parties have legislative
majorities, but they control sizeable blocs. In three states – Chin, Kayin,
Rakhine – the ethnic parties collectively control more seats than the USDP.
2. Through their membership of legislative standing
committees. Standing committees
are appointed to carry out certain legislative functions,
including during the periods when the legislatures themselves are in recess;
they mostly include legislators from ethnic parties. (So far, committees that
have been established are the Legislative Committees, the National Races
Affairs Committees and the Representatives Vetting Committees.)
3. Through their positions in state governments.
A number of ministerial portfolios in the seven states
have been given to legislators from ethnic nationality parties. Under the
constitution, the decentralized powers are rather limited. Nevertheless, they
include a number of areas that can have a significant impact on people’s lives:
land (including allocation of land and agricultural loans), local business
(small business loans and some taxation), cultural promotion, and municipal
issues.
How this decentralization process will function in
practice remains uncertain. While the division of powers is defined in general
terms in the constitution and in legislation, the detailed implementation – and,
in particular, how administrative functions will be divided and coordinated between
central government ministries and regional governments – has not been worked
out in practice. It seems that it will be resolved on a gradual, ad hoc basis,
and it could be a source of contestation and confusion, in the short term.
Confusingly, different regions and states have chosen to
establish different – and somewhat idiosyncratic – sets of local government
ministries. It is understandable that Kachin
State (which has abundant mineral
resources and where there is much mining) has a ministry for mines while Chin State
does not. It is less obvious why Kachin
State has a health
ministry but no separate education ministry (it is included in the combined
“Education/social and religious affairs/culture” ministry), while Chin and
Kayah states have neither (although the responsibility of the social affairs
ministries in these states may well extend to health and education). And the
creation of a combined “Meat, fish, mines and energy” ministry in Rakhine State appears odd and without precedent.
What is significant, though, is that these local
legislatures and governments offer the possibility for ethnic populations to
have a much greater say in the governance of their affairs. There are several
reasons why decentralization has the potential to bring improvements
over the previous, highly centralized, system:
1. Local decision-making. Some
decisions on governance issues will now be taken at a local level, which will
be a major change from the highly centralized decision-making of the past.
Previously, those decisions that were taken at the local level were made by the
regional military commander, who had a military and security focus, and who did
not have to explain his decisions to anyone except his military superiors. Now,
local governments will have at least some accountability to elected local
representatives, through the state/region legislatures.
2. Influence of local civil and religious leaders.
In a situation where some decision making and power is decentralized, the
influence of local non-government authority figures can be enhanced. The views
of figures such as Buddhist abbots, leaders of other religions, and civil society
leaders may carry considerable weight locally, but not necessarily at a national
government level, something which limited their ability to influence decisions
in the past.
3. The voice of local people. If decision
making becomes more local, and has greater input from local community leaders,
this implies that local people could have a greater voice in governance –
directly, though local political leaders, or indirectly, through community
leaders.In such a context, service delivery can improve, through
improved understanding of local needs, and because accountability is also at
that local level.
4. Resourcing. Decentralization could lead
to greater resources being available in previously-neglected ethnic minority
areas. Local governments will be able to raise revenue directly (in the sectors
where they have revenue-collecting authority, and will be able to request
central government budget allocations. With all Chief Ministers sitting on the Financial Commission, there will be opportunities to lobby
for funding, and it will be more difficult than in the past for ethnic minority
areas to be neglected.
5. Political competition. Local elections
will over time create a culture of political competitiveness. This can promote
better governance in obvious ways, by giving incentives for politicians to
deliver on key areas of concern to the local populace. Governance may therefore
shift a little along the continuum from authoritarianism to populism, but it
would be naïve to expect such a shift to be sudden or dramatic. Experiences of
decentralization in diverse developing-country contexts in recent years have
demonstrated that such a process has the potential to bring positive changes.
But this is certainly not to be taken for granted, and in a situation like Burma, where
there is an entrenched culture of authoritarian (in some cases almost feudal)
attitudes to governance, and hierarchical social structures, a considerable
degree of caution is warranted.
There are certainly risks that local decision making will
impose an inefficient and burdensome additional layer of state bureaucracy, that it will
promote the emergence of corrupt or predatory local power holders, and that
elections, instead of promoting accountability, will lead to cronyism and
vote-buying. Other countries in the region, such as Indonesia
and Thailand,
experienced a mixture of positive and negative impacts of democratization and
decentralization during their transitions from dictatorship to more democratic
rule. Burma
can expect something similar. A particular issue in the short term will be
capacity constraints. Local officials may not have all the experience and
skills needed to take on their new governance responsibilities.
Understanding of market economy principles, evidence-based
policymaking, and finance and budgetary skills are likely to be particular
issues (indeed, constraints in this area exist at the national level also). The
situation is similar for the legislative branch. In ethnic states, nationality
parties have some legislative and executive authority, but in many cases are
severely lacking in financial and human resources, and in experience of the
basics of legislative functioning and democratic and accountable governance.
Given its powerful role, the military has the potential to
be a spoiler in such a context, in different ways. First, the army has become
accustomed to having full control over all decisions, military and civil, at
the local level (just as it did at the national level). It can be anticipated
that the new batch of regional commanders will not give up such power easily.
Second, military regional commands and individual battalions have built up
considerable economic interests. This makes the army a significant economic
actor at the local level, raising the prospect both of it using this economic
power to promote its political interests, and using its political power in the
furtherance of its economic interests.
These are real concerns, and the national armed forces (“Tatmadaw”)
will certainly remain a very powerful force at local level, just as it will at
the national level. But the military’s role will be curtailed somewhat by two
important factors. First is the fact that the new batch of regional commanders are relatively young/ junior officers, whereas
many chief ministers are powerful former military figures.
In the Burman heartland, this has probably been a
deliberate strategy in order to ensure that the military regional commanders
are subordinate to the new quasi-civilian structures headed by the chief
ministers. Thus, for example, the Region (formerly Division) chief ministers
are mostly former lieutenant-generals or major-generals. In the ethnic states,
however, the chief ministers do not have the same military credentials
Second is the fact that, according to some reliable
sources, the military has given orders that all “self-reliance” business
activities and income-generation schemes by military units must stop, and that
only the two official military companies – the Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) – may
conduct such activities. This would reduce the army’s economic role at a local
level. If true, ending the “self-reliance” strategy is potentially very
significant. In the early 1990s, when the military budget was under pressure
due to the rapid increase in the size of the army, it introduced a policy of
self-reliance, whereby units in the field had to find ways to finance their own
operations.
This led to all kinds of abusive activities, including
forced labour, land confiscation, and ‘informal taxation’. The burden has been
particularly heavy in the ethnic borderlands, where many military units are
stationed. But for any new policy to alleviate this burden, it is necessary for
orders to end self-reliance activities to be accompanied by sufficient
additional resources to army units. Otherwise, it will merely lead to different
forms of abuse, as units struggle to find new ways to obtain finances, food and
support other operational needs. It is unknown whether such additional
resources are being made available.
Prospects
for Peace
Just
as important as improved governance of ethnic nationality areas is the
fundamental issue of resolving the decades-long cycles of conflict and violence
that have afflicted the orderlands,
taking a large human toll and impeding the development of these regions. Can
the transition to the new government help to promote peace, or will it merely
represent another chapter in the history of the conflict?
Prior to the elections, tensions rose significantly. The
military junta put considerable pressure on ceasefire groups to transform into
Border Guard Forces under the command of the Tatmadaw. After a series of
deadlines passed without agreement by most of the major groups, the junta set a
final deadline of 1 September 2010 for all ceasefire groups to transform into
Border Guard Forces.
While some groups did make the transformation (including
most units of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army, the New Democratic
Army-Kachin, and the Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front), most of
the larger groups did not – including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the National Democratic Alliance Army,
the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and part of the Shan State Army-North, which now
calls itself Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
Following the deadline, the State media began referring to
the ceasefire groups who had not transformed as “insurgents”, raising concerns
that the government might take military action against them at some point, as
it had done in 2009 against the Kokang ceasefire group.
Tensions had also risen because of the refusal of the
election commission to register the main Kachin parties that intended to
contest (including the Kachin State Progressive Party in Kachin
State and the Northern Shan State
Progressive e Party in Shan
State). Members of these
parties who subsequently tried to register as independent candidates were also
barred,leaving the Kachin without any distinctive representation
in the elections.
A reminder of the reality of ethnic grievances, and the
violence that can result, came even on the day of the elections. A Democratic
Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) leader who was disgruntled at the prospect of transforming
into a Border Guard Force (Col. Lah Pwe, also known as “N’kam Mweh” or “Mr.
Moustache”), briefly occupied the Burma border town of Myawaddy. The following
day, a second border town further to the south, Pyathonzu (Three Pagoda
Pass), was also briefly
overrun by renegade DKBA troops. These actions, and the ensuing retaliation
from the Tatmadaw, caused significant displacement of civilians.
In addition to the military’s strong reaction to the actions by DKBA renegades, there have
also been renewed clashes in Shan
State, with the Tatmadaw
attacking SSPP/SSA positions from March 2011. But there were no military
moves against other ceasefire groups such as the UWSA, KIO or NMSP, who were
also refusing to join the Border Guard Force scheme, but who were not taking
any offensive actions. It seems that the military government leadership preferred
not to engage in any major military operations when it was at the point of
completing its political roadmap and transition to a new generation of leaders.
This interpretation was reinforced by an incident in Kachin State
in early February. A Tatmadaw battalion entered an area controlled by
the KIO, leading to a clash with Kachin soldiers that left the Burma battalion
commander dead.10 The incident could easily have been used to justify an
escalation, but instead the government reacted cautiously, apparently
determining that its battalion had acted improperly by entering KIO territory
unannounced, and took no further action.11 It is too early to tell what the
new government’s policy towards the ceasefire and insurgent groups will be, and
the extent to which the executive will be able to rein in or determine Tatmadaw
activities. Initial statements from the new President have been
conciliatory, and it seems unlikely that the government is planning to adopt a
belligerent stance, at least in the short term. Neighbouring governments are
also worried about the unresolved ethnic and security challenges. The Chinese
government, especially, is concerned about the prospect of renewed conflict on
its shared border with Burma,
both in terms of border stability, and because of its massive infrastructural
investments in Burma.
These include several hydroelectric schemes, and an enormous investment in the
energy and transport corridor through Burma
to the Indian Ocean – which will include twin
oil and gas pipelines, a highway, and a
high speed rail link. China
has therefore sent clear messages to the ceasefire groups and the Burma
government that it would like to see these issues resolved peacefully. This
message was reiterated to the new government during the 2 April visit to Nay
Pyi Taw by Jia Qinglin, the fourth ranking Chinese leader, to welcome the new Burma
government. The safety and security of Chinese citizens in Burma is another
concern.
The Thailand
government, too, is watching the situation with caution, not only because of
the major refugee and migrant worker challenges on its western border, but also
because of major Thai investment plans in Burma. In particular, the Dawei
Development Project in contested areas of southern Burma is likely to reshape the
regional political geography forever, as is discussed further below.
For the moment, President Thein Sein’s conciliatory
statements have been taken positively by ceasefire groups. The UWSA has
welcomed the President’s remarks, and reiterated its position, set out in a 26
March statement, that it wished to solve the current disagreements with the
government through dialogue. And at a two-day meeting in Yangon
in April 2011, five ethnic parties issued a statement saying inter alia that
peace is the key prerequisite for development in ethnic areas. However, it is
unclear how the current deadlock can be resolved, now that positions on both
sides have become entrenched. The major ceasefire groups had grave reservations
about the Border Guard Force scheme, which they have rejected, whereas an
ultimatum already issued by the old regime will be hard for the new government
to back away from. Agreement from the election commission to register the Kachin
State Progressive Party, or allow its senior members to run as independent candidates
in the by-elections expected later this year, could go some way to ameliorating
the KIO’s concerns, but is unlikely to be sufficient. Other kinds of assurance
will be needed to convince the Wa to bring their armed forces under government
command, and it is hard to see this happening any time soon; fundamentally,
they are unhappy with the status of their area under the new constitution.
There are already warning signs that more ethnic ceasefires could break down.
In particular, in early 2011 the ceasefire KIO, NMSP and SSA/SSPP resumed
relations in the newly-formed United Nationalities Federal Council with the
Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Chin
National Front (CNF) and other non-ceasefire groups. No joint actions have been
agreed. But the intention of armed opposition leaders is to prepare for renewed
conflict – an eventuality, however, they say that they want to avoid.
It is thus equally critical how the new government will
deal with the KNU, KNPP, Shan State Army-South and other no ceasefire groups
who continue their longstanding insurgencies. The political and military
strength of these groups has been on the decline, but although they now control
little fixed territory, they can operate across large swathes of the
southeastern borderlands. The Tatmadaw’s brutal counterinsurgency
strategies, which target not only the armed groups themselves but also the
civilian population in the areas they operate in, continue unchanged. While Thailand is
putting increasing pressure on these groups, by denying them safe haven and
rear-supply routes (and raising the prospect of closing the refugee camps which
provide support bases for the KNU), and the Tatmadaw is limiting their scope
of operation, in the end no military action can fully resolve the situation.
Negotiations and an improved future for long-marginalized populations is the
only way that peace can be achieved.
Whatever the short-term developments, in the medium term
it is probably the changing geostrategic and economic context that will have
the biggest impact on Burma’s
border areas and the prospects for peace. The economic boom experienced by and Thailand) over
the past 20 years meant that the previously isolated border regions ended up
adjacent to areas of phenomenal economic growth. This represented a kind of
centrifugal force, with these areas being pulled closer to neighbouring
economies and away from the centres of power in Burma. This is a trend that was
criticised by President Thein Sein in his comments to the border areas
committee, when he noted the tendency of some people in these areas “relying on
the other country” and the need for “cultivating the spirit of cherishing their
own country and regions”. It is indeed possible that the next phase in the
economic development of the region – increased economic integration and
“connectivity” – will mitigate those centrifugal forces. Many border areas will
find themselves no longer merely adjacent to areas of growth, but strategically
located on major economic corridors: Dawei to Thailand
through Tanintharyi Region; Kyaukpyu to China
through Rakhine State,
central Burma, and Shan State;
Sittwe to India through Rakhine State
and Chin State;
and the reconstructed Ledo road from China
to India across Kachin State.
The size and importance of these projects will ultimately
ensure that the continuation of insurgencies in most border areas becomes untenable.
But this certainly does not mean that the underlying grievances of ethnic
minority populations will be alleviated, or that violence will end in the short
term. In fact these developments are likely to build an additional set of new grievances.
A lack of consultation with affected communities, and a
sense among those communities that they are not being accorded a fair share of
the benefits, can potentially heighten tensions. This has already been experienced
in the context of the major hydroelectric schemes currently under construction
along the Chinese border, which have been the target of violent attack. Local
people have strong feelings about these developments, which will see them
displaced from their ancestral lands and denied their source of livelihoods, while
the electricity is sold to China,
profiting only the central government.
Conclusion
Two months after a new government took over the reins of
power in Burma,
it is too early to make any definitive assessment of the prospects for improved
governance and peace in ethnic areas. Initial signs give some reason for
optimism, but the difficulty of overcoming sixty years of conflict and
strongly-felt grievances and deep suspicions should not be underestimated. The
economic and geostrategic realities are changing fast, and they will have a
fundamental impact – positive and negative – on Burma’s borderlands. But unless
ethnic communities are able to have much greater say in the governance of their
affairs, and begin to see tangible benefits from the massive development projects
in their areas, peace and broad-based development will remain elusive.
The new decentralized governance structures have the
potential to make a positive contribution in this regard, but it is unclear if
they can evolve into sufficiently powerful and genuinely representative bodies
quickly enough to satisfy ethnic nationality aspirations.
Courtesy Transnational Institute - Burma Centre Netherlands (TNI-BCN)
